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Measuring value sensitivity in medicine
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Abstract
Background: Value sensitivity – the ability to recognize value-related issues when they arise in practice – is an
indispensable competence for medical practitioners to enter decision-making processes related to ethical questions.
However, the psychological competence of value sensitivity is seldom an explicit subject in the training of medical
professionals. In this contribution, we outline the traditional concept of moral sensitivity in medicine and its revised
form conceptualized as value sensitivity and we propose an instrument that measures value sensitivity.
Methods: We developed an instrument for assessing the sensitivity for three value groups (moral-related values,
values related to the principles of biomedical ethics, strategy-related values) in a four step procedure: 1) value
identification (n = 317); 2) value representation (n = 317); 3) vignette construction and quality evaluation (n = 37);
and 4) instrument validation by comparing nursing professionals with hospital managers (n = 48).
Results: We find that nursing professionals recognize and ascribe importance to principle-related issues more than
professionals from hospital management. The latter are more likely to recognize and ascribe importance to
strategy-related issues.
Conclusions: These hypothesis-driven results demonstrate the discriminatory power of our newly developed
instrument, which makes it useful not only for health care professionals in practice but for students and people
working in the clinical context as well.
Keywords: Value sensitivity, Moral sensitivity, Ethical sensitivity, Moral values, Moral competences, Medical ethics
training
Background
In medicine, there is a need to emphasize the psychological
prerequisites for clinical acting [1]. Generally, psychological
moral competencies [2, 3] of medical professionals are rarely
assessed, and there are hardly any instruments that are ap-
propriate to measure such competencies. One such relevant
competence is value sensitivity, a prerequisite for moral
decision-making and behavior. Based on previous research
(identification and characterization of domain specific values
[4]), we aimed at developing an instrument which measures
value sensitivity in medicine. The instrument aims at sup-
porting medical professionals and their patients by empow-
ering healthcare practitioners to recognize issues with
ethical relevance when they arise in practice. With this
work, we outline the procedural steps necessary for the
development of the instrument. Finally, we describe the val-
idation of the instrument by means of a group comparison.
The concept of moral sensitivity
The discussion regarding sensitivity for values has trad-
itionally focused on moral values, broadly construed as
standards of what is valuable or important in certain
issues or situations. Moral sensitivity (also referred to as
moral awareness or ethical sensitivity/sensibility) then is
traditionally defined as the ability to recognize moral is-
sues when they arise in practice [3, 5–8], see also [9] or
[10] for reviews on varying definitions of the construct].
More precisely, moral sensitivity incorporates both the
ability to recognize moral issues in a morally ambiguous
situation and the ascription of importance to these same
issues [11]. It includes being responsive to the needs of
others in addition to anticipating whether a course of action
can harm or help others or whether it violates internalized
moral standards or codes of conduct that are usually con-
cretions of values. In line with this conceptualization, we
adopt the definition of moral sensitivity that includes both
the recognition and the ascription of importance to moral
values. Accordingly, moral sensitivity is proposed to cover
both, an intuitive- (quick, reflexive recognition of a morally
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relevant aspect in a situation) and a deliberative process
(vectored attentiveness to morally relevant aspects).
Lack of moral sensitivity — also called moral blindness
— is likely to have far-reaching consequences. Researchers
found that “morally blind” people can act with the best of
intentions but behave in contradiction to their own values
and principles, without being aware of it [12]. If the moral
issues at stake are not identified, no moral problem will
exist for the individual and therefore there will be no need
to enter into a moral problem-solving phase [13]. Thus, it
is obvious that without a certain moral awareness, there is
no reason to question one’s or other’s behaviors from a
moral point of view. Consequently, without moral sensi-
tivity, professionals may not be able to appropriately
recognize, interpret and respond to the concerns of pa-
tients and their relatives.
Although many researchers agree on categorizing
moral sensitivity as a prerequisite for the initiation of
moral decision making (e.g. [6, 13]), past research has
focused more on the development of instruments for
measuring the latter while largely neglecting the former
[14]. The Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test (DEST) by
Bebeau and Rest (1982) [15] is the oldest measure of
moral sensitivity and was created to measure individuals’
ability to identify ethical issues and deviations from pro-
fessional codes of ethics in dental practice. More recent
attempts focus on the measurement of moral sensitivity
in the business domain (e.g., in accounting or business
situations). In 2007, Jordan [9] provided a comprehen-
sive review and critical evaluation of the available mea-
surements, pointing out that there is still a great need
for validated measures of moral sensitivity (see also [16]
for an emphasis of the medical context). A concise
evaluation of those tests indicates that current instru-
ments fall short regarding several aspects (see also [9]).
For example, they often lack an evaluation based on cri-
teria of diagnostic test theory. Our research project aims
at developing an instrument for the measure of moral
sensitivity which overcomes such pitfalls and is part of a
comprehensive theory of moral intelligence [3].
We will expand the concept of moral sensitivity by
considering a broader spectrum of values. The reason
for this is that the current research on moral sensitivity
focuses on values whose relation to morality is undis-
puted both from a theoretical perspective (i.e., they are
discussed as prototypical moral values in the ethics
literature) and based on empirical findings (i.e., people
consider those values to be moral values). Examples
include benevolence, honesty, or fairness. However, in
professional contexts, other values may be relevant as
well, although they may not be perceived as moral values
(e.g. cost-effectiveness or reputation). By the term ‘value’
we refer to stable beliefs about desirable states or con-
ducts of behavior, which serve as general normative
standards to judge and justify actions not necessarily re-
lated to ethics [17]. Therefore, we suggest that an assess-
ment of moral sensitivity should include values that are
not intuitively perceived as moral but that refer to legit-
imate claims within the specified domain. By “domain”,
we refer to any social sector, for example, professional
fields such as medicine or business, associated with a
specific set of values that are considered to be important
in that sector. In the following, we therefore refer to the
more general notion of “value sensitivity”. Based on
previous research [4], value sensitivity in the research
context of medicine is composed of three subcompo-
nents: sensitivity for moral-related, principle-related and
strategy-related values.
The relevance of value sensitivity in medicine
The medical domain exceptionally challenges ones’ moral
competencies because of numerous problems in that do-
main. These include actions under time pressure, inclu-
sion of high-level moral values (e.g. non-maleficence) and
dilemmas involving numerous stakeholders apart from
structural barriers. Much of the controversial discussion
focuses on codes of conduct. Some authors certify that
these codes have only minor impacts on daily practice
[18] and found that nurses evaluate them as being of little
use [19]. Some studies investigating the success of teach-
ing medical ethics even observed that the student’s moral
sensitivity diminished over the course [20]. This result
may indicate that traditional teaching strategies tend to
overlook the key competence of recognizing moral aspects
in ambiguous clinical situations. In the past, authors such
as Kleinmann complained about the neglect to promote
psychological competences in teaching programs [1]. Con-
sequently, the question of which specific psychological
abilities have to be trained to realize such competency has
not been adequately emphasized. Accordingly, we point
out that moral behavior is not solely reflected in know-
ledge about ethics but also by paying attention to ones’
psychological competencies. Both aspects should be in-
cluded in medical education.
If moral behavior rests on moral competencies, the need
for tools to measure the baseline status with the possibility
of training such skills becomes an important undertaking
[21]. We suggest that one way of supporting health care
professionals’ training is to allow them to learn about their
individual strengths and weaknesses with respect to their
own value sensitivity. In medicine, it is important to be
able to obtain a swift recognition of which values are in-
volved in a particular situation and which stakeholders
could be affected by the ethical decision (e.g. patient,
physician, or close relatives). Additively, the body of evi-
dence suggests that people differ quite substantially in
terms of moral- (or more generally value-) sensitivity
[9, 11, 22–29]. Therefore, we consider it as an
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imperative to holistically integrate the insights of re-
cent moral (psychological) research about the condi-
tions of human moral ability into medicine in general
and in the process of education of medical professionals
in particular. Potential applications of our model are:
(1) as a diagnostic tool for medical professionals in
order to mirror possible strengths and weaknesses, (2)
as an educational tool in the context of medical school
and (3) as an instrument for advanced training of indi-
viduals, who work, for example, as clinical ethicists.
Methods
Developing an instrument for measuring value sensitivity
As outlined in the last paragraph of section “The con-
cept of moral sensitivity”, we embed moral sensitivity
into the broader concept of value sensitivity. We per-
formed steps towards developing an instrument designed
to assess sensitivity towards three value groups. First,
based on previous research we gained empirical evidence
for a domain-specific value selection as well as insights
into what extent the values are perceived as moral values
(step 1: value identification). Notably, domain-specificity
may include the possibility that the perceived morality of
values differ between domains. Thus, in business com-
pared to medicine, it is likely that other values are
deemed important and shared values might cluster dif-
ferently. This relates to the work of Bebeau and Thoma
[30] who used the term “intermediate ethical constructs”
to refer to profession-specific concepts within a given
domain (e.g. in medicine: professional autonomy, in-
formed consent, privacy). Second, we obtained represen-
tative statements which were used as stimulus material
instead of naming the values explicitly (step 2: value rep-
resentation). Third, we developed and validated morally
ambiguous vignettes characteristic of the clinical context
(step 3: vignette construction and selection). These three
steps are described below. In paragraph “Testing the val-
idity of the value-sensitivity measure”, we describe the
validation of the instrument by means of a group
comparison.
The functioning of the instrument is summarized as
follows (see Fig. 1 below): Using a vignette-based ap-
proach, the instrument has been designed to present
people with morally ambiguous situational descriptions
and to investigate 1) which values they are more or less
likely to identify and 2) which values they consider im-
portant within the presented scenario. After vignette
presentation, respondents were provided with a list of
value-related statements (items, see step 2: value repre-
sentation) among which they could choose. The extent
to which respondents to several vignettes choose more
moral-related values and rank them as more important
relative to other categories of values is indicative for
moral-related value sensitivity.
All studies in this research project were conducted in
accordance with the ethical review processes of the Uni-
versity of Zurich and the checklist for the ethical evalu-
ation of empirical studies that don’t need mandatory
authorization (CEBES) of the Institute of Biomedical Eth-
ics and History of Medicine (http://www.ibme.uzh.ch/en/
biomedicalethics/forschung/cebesEN.html) and were ana-
lyzed using the software package SPSS Version 23.
Step 1: value identification
A general challenge when assessing value sensitivity is the
identification of relevant values for the domain under con-
sideration. There is also the challenge of investigating to
what extent these values are perceived as moral— or non-
moral in order to develop balanced vignettes that include
several different values and that reflect the moral ambigu-
ity of a particular situation (see step 3).
Participants and Procedures
In order to examine which values are perceived as being
examples of moral or other categories of values, a sam-
ple of medical students and professionals (n = 317; 54.3%
females, mean age: 26.6) was asked to evaluate a number
of values along four moral-related dimensions (for more
details see [4]).
Outcome
The main outcome involved an empirically informed
classification of distinct value-clusters along the moral
vs. strategic (non-moral) continuum. Based on that, we
were able to classify 11 values in three clusters: A first
cluster (the “general morality-related cluster”) was com-
posed of the values of responsibility, honesty, loyalty and
respect. These values obtained higher ratings on all
moral-related dimensions, suggesting that they were per-
ceived as examples of moral values. A second cluster
(“strategy-related cluster”) included the values perform-
ance, cost-efficiency and reputation. These values re-
ceived consistently low ratings on all dimensions,
suggesting that they were perceived as unrelated to
moral aspects. Interestingly, we found that all values as-
sociated with the principles of biomedical ethics [31] –
non-maleficence, justice, beneficence (in our context: care,
for an explanation see [4]) and autonomy — formed a sep-
arate, third cluster (“principle-related cluster”). Based on
the ratings, those values were between the other two clus-
ters, yet closer to the moral than to the strategy-related
value-cluster. Due to their importance in training medical
personnel in biomedical ethics, this group was included in
the instrument development as well. (For an in-depth de-
scription of the rationale for selecting values and their
categorization into three groups, see [4]). Notably, some
of the values (care, non-maleficence, loyalty, justice) relate
to Haidt’s moral foundations [32], although not all of them
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received ratings such that they have been classified in the
general morality-related cluster.
Step 2: value representation
Since our assessment of individuals’ sensitivity to
particular categories of values is based on the kind of
value-related items that people consider relevant for the
situation contained in the vignette, another challenge
was to minimize the flaw of provoking socially desirable
answers. Such a risk may be likely when values (such as
honesty, fairness, and the like) are explicitly named in an
item. A central issue was therefore to avoid naming the
value in the wording of the items, such that the presen-
tation of stimulus material to subjects did not guide par-
ticipants to attend to ethical issues. The method used
here was designed to minimize this flaw. Furthermore,
providing only a single value term involves the risk that
the meaning of the term is under-determined for the
participant. In step 2 of the construction phase, we
therefore wanted to obtain adequate descriptions of such
values, preferably by using short statements for each
value describing typical behavioral manifestations of the
corresponding value. The statements had to fulfill the
criteria (1) of inherent and related normativity (i.e. they
had to be similar to the values they describe), (2) they
should incorporate the perspectives of different stake-
holders (patients, doctors; hospitals and care-centers),
(3) they should incorporate different behavioral actions
which match the values, and (4) finally they should
be synonymous, as opposed to explicitly naming the
value at stake. In order to present material for
quality-assessment, we developed four statements for
each value.
Participants and Procedures
The statements were presented in randomized order.
Participants (same sample as in step 1, n = 317) quality-
checked each statement using a bipolar 6-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (not representative at all) to 6 (very
representative). In order to effectively avoid socially
01
02
03
04
Vignette
Statements:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Allocate points:
2
7
9
4
1
5
Vignette presentation
Task: read situational
description
Statement presentation
Task: select those statements
which  you consider to be
associated with the previously
read situation
Allocation of importance
Task: distribute points to the
previously selected statements
After 5 vignettes:
Calculation of value
sensitivity
Calculation of Value Sensitivity: 
Procedure for assessing
value sensitivity
Fig. 1 A situational description (vignette) is presented on the computer screen: after having read one vignette which disappears upon clicking
the “next”-button, participants are provided with a list of value-related statements. They are asked to select those statements which they consider
to be associated with the previously read situation. This task is designed to examine which values participants recognize in each vignette. Next,
the vignette reappears together with all previously chosen statements and participants are asked to distribute points (i.e. allocate importance) to
these same statements. This task is designed to assess the perceived importance of the selected value. Note: The formula denotes how value
sensitivity is currently calculated: the mean of recognized values for each cluster (e.g. strategy-related values) is multiplied with the normalized
number of points allocated to the corresponding value-cluster
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desirable answer tendencies, we included one distractor-
statement in every set of statements. For example, one
distractor-statement describing “performance” was in-
cluded in a set of four statements describing “auton-
omy”. Accordingly, participants were presented with five
statements per value. As distractors, we used prelimin-
ary developed but superfluous value statements.
Outcome
In order to obtain representative statements for each
value, we calculated the mean of each statement based on
the Likert scale evaluation of participants (due to the vast
number of statements, the whole list of statements is pre-
sented in Table 1a, b in Additional file 1 only). Statements
resembled the following structure: For care we used “A
physician or a caregiver should provide assistance to
patients who cannot help themselves”. A high mean value
indicated high representativeness. Statements were
selected only if their mean value was above 4.5. Six out of
44 statements did not meet this criterion and were ex-
cluded for step 3 and the validation study. After
representativeness-testing, we retrieved two to three state-
ments for each value which could be integrated as stimu-
lus material into our instrument.
Most distractors achieved the lowest mean-values for
each value-group (9 of 11; see Additional file 1: Table S2
Distractor analysis). In one case including the value “re-
sponsibility” where the distractor achieved a higher mean
value, the distractor was inappropriately chosen due to ex-
cessive semantic overlap (distractor for responsibility was
“care”). We also conducted t-tests for verifying statistical
significant differences between distractors and the mean-
wise lowest statement for every value (analysis performed
prior to exclusion of any statement). Results demonstrated
a statistically significant effect on 8 of the 11 comparisons
(see Additional file 1: Table S2 Distractor analysis).
Step 3: vignette construction and selection
Step 3 consisted of constructing vignettes that de-
scribe ambiguous conflict situations that do not pull
extensively in a specific value-direction (verified by
analyzing the more or less even distribution of values
selected by participants) and that are relevant for the
medical context. Based on a literature research and
interviews with medical experts in Switzerland, we
developed 12 vignettes of approximately equal length,
morally ambiguous content and the integration of
multiple stakeholders. Prior to study inclusion for
quality assessment, these vignettes were reviewed by
external experts from medical ethics.
Participants and procedures
After assessing demographic information (gender, age,
field of study, number of completed semesters) and
information about participants’ work experience in
medicine (whether they have work experience, and what
kind of experience), participants (n = 37; 78.4% females,
mean age M = 25.9 years, 62% medical students, 16%
from nursing school, 45.9% reported to have work ex-
perience) were instructed to put themselves in the role
of a clinical expert in charge who is partly involved as a
committee member of a clinical expert-group. They were
told that currently, there were six cases (2 cohorts, 6
cases/vignettes per cohort) to be discussed during the
next committee meeting. In this way, the participants
were primed in a similar way as in the main study (see
validation study, below). Then, the participants were
asked to evaluate the vignettes according to the follow-
ing quality criteria: (1) comprehensibility, (2) required
level of expert-knowledge, (3) relation to reality, (4) ex-
tent of achievement-oriented, reputation-related or
economic-related content and (5) extent of moral-
related or social-oriented content using a bipolar 5-
point-Likert scale. (4) and (5) were assessed as quality
criteria for moral ambiguity (i.e. balanced involvement
of moral and strategic aspects in the vignette, [6]).
Moral ambiguity is a vital prerequisite of vignettes to
prevent biased responses. The vignettes were all be-
tween 137 and 202 words long, developed and prese-
lected by two writers and one external reviewer and
written based on the results of steps 1 and 2.
Outcome
We calculated the means of the 5-point-Likert scale
evaluations regarding quality and moral ambiguity of the
vignettes (the results of the descriptive analysis are given
in Table 1). Vignettes were selected for further review if
(1) comprehensibility was achieved (i.e. mean values ≤
2.5), if (2) the requirement of expert-knowledge was
moderate (i.e. mean values between 1.5 and 3.5), if (3)
relation to reality was high (i.e. mean values < 2.5) and if
(4) the vignettes incorporated both strategic as well as
moral aspects but not to a very obvious but rather am-
biguous extent (i.e. mean values < 4.5).
A pivotal criterion was the balance between strategic
and moral elements in each vignette (i.e. moral ambigu-
ity). To test moral ambiguity and based on the average
rating (MMoral, MStrategic), we conducted single t-Tests to
test for dissimilarity. If means differed significantly, the
vignette was excluded. Moreover, a Shapiro-Wilk test
was conducted and yielded a significant result highlight-
ing non-normality of the data due to the low sample
sizes of the preselected vignettes. Therefore, a non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test was executed. All
results of the single t-Tests were confirmed. Five vi-
gnettes (number 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7, see Table 1) fulfilled the
necessary criteria and were included as stimulus material
in our instrument. The five chosen vignettes involved
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work-place problems within a clinic (V1 & V3), conflict
within a nursing home (V5) and two vignettes including
research issues in neurology (V6 & V7). The results are
described for the selected vignettes only (the selected vi-
gnettes are displayed in Additional file 1: Selected
Vignettes).
As mentioned earlier, the previously described three
steps encompassed the first phase in the development of
our value-sensitivity measure. In what follows, we
advance this work by providing a first validity test of this
measure.
Results
Testing the validity of the value-sensitivity measure
Hypothesis generation for expected group differences
In our final step, we aimed at demonstrating the validity
of the measure by making use of a group comparison.
Hypothesis generation for the group comparison in-
cluded some theoretical concepts: Regarding the reasons
for inter-individual differences in perceiving moral issues
in ambiguous situations, contemporary research predom-
inately refers to social cognition theory (e.g., [33]) positing
that individuals hold cognitive schemas (i.e. cognitive rep-
resentations) depending on socialization. These models
also imply that priming (activating a concept by providing
external stimuli such as a word, a picture or an object;
[34]) of a representation would foster its future activation
by increasing its accessibility. Consistent with this, a
substantial body of research clearly demonstrated that
(consciously or subconsciously) primed information guide
attention, encoding and the categorization of the situation
by making concepts temporarily more accessible (for an
overview see [35–37]).
Some schemas are chronically accessible in that they
become automatically and habitually activated [36, 38].
Examples of chronic accessible representations are
strong attitudes and deeply held values, beliefs or traits
that are central to one’s identity or culture. In line with
this, moral standards or values are acknowledged as
moral schemas that vary in their accessibility [2, 11, 39].
Hence, individuals whose moral schemas are more ac-
cessible or even chronically accessible are expected to be
more likely to direct attention more or less automatically
and swiftly to moral issues — the same holds for sche-
mas that represent other types of issues (e.g., strategic
issues). For example, Jordan [11] has argued that busi-
ness managers are less likely to detect moral-related
dimensions than academics, because business managers
have business rather than moral schemas guiding their
attention and information processing more dominantly.
Overall, researchers in moral psychology consistently
conceive the activation and accessibility of moral sche-
mas as crucial conditions of demonstrating moral sensi-
tivity [9, 23, 40–42].
Based on the above delineation of the underlying
theoretical concepts, our working hypothesis is that our
instrument demonstrates ample discriminatory power
between two groups of participants: care-professionals
and professionals from hospital management. This hy-
pothesis is built according to social cognition theory
proposing that socialization in various working contexts
shapes people’s cognitive schema (e.g. [11]). It is well-
known from previous research that schemas strongly in-
fluence information processing, making people more
likely to attend to, encode and recall information which
match with the existing schemas (e.g., [36, 43]). In line
Table 1 Mean value quality analysis of vignettes
Quality-criteria Moral ambiguity
Comprehensibility Expert knowledge Relation to reality Strategic Moral Δ
Vignette No M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) (SD) p
1 1.63 (0.89) 1.69 (0.80) 1.62 (0.62) 4.19 (0.98) 4.19 (0.75) (1.42) 1.000
2 1.76 (0.83) 1.94 (1.03) 2.12 (0.86) 4.65 (0.79) 3.41 (1.00) (1.25) 0.001**
3 1.63 (0.89) 2.81 (1.11) 1.38 (0.62) 3.38 (1.54) 3.88 (0.89) (1.86) 0.300
4 1.82 (0.81) 2.59 (1.00) 2.18 (0.88) 4.59 (0.62) 3.82 (1.02) (1.26) 0.023*
5 1.41 (0.87) 1.59 (1.00) 2.24 (0.75) 4.18 (0.95) 4.29 (0.85) (0.78) 0.543
6 2.5 (1.32) 2.63 (1.31) 1.69 (0.70) 3.53 (1.06) 3.53 (0.83) (1.46) 1.000
7 1.89 (0.94) 3.16 (1.07) 1.79 (0.86) 4.21 (1.03) 4.26 (0.93) (1.13) 0.841
8 1.35 (0.59) 2.35 (1.23) 1.75 (0.91) 4.1 (0.97) 4.95 (0.22) (0.99) 0.001**
9 1.84 (1.17) 3.26 (1.05) 2.47 (1.17) 2.53 (1.07) 4.21 (0.98) (1.29) 0.000***
10 1.52 (0.81) 2.62 (1.12) 1.29 (0.56) 3.81 (1.03) 4.9 (0.30) (1.04) 0.000***
11 1.83 (0.86) 2.33 (1.24) 2.5 (0.86) 4.61 (1.15) 3.56 (1.34) (1.83) 0.026*
12 1.62 (0.5) 2.75 (0.93) 1.75 (0.68) 3.44 (1.41) 4.75 (0.78) (1.49) 0.003**
remark : vignettes (bold) were selected if: Mcomprehensibility≤ 2.5, 1.5 <Mexpert_knowledge < 3.5, Mrelation_to_reality < 2.5, Mmoral/strategic < 4.5, Δns; *p < .05,
** p < .01, *** p < .001
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with this, and because of being embedded in a working
environment that expects from its members an orienta-
tion towards the principles of biomedical ethics which
are also part of nurses’ training programs in ethics, we
hypothesized nurses to be more likely to demonstrate
greater sensitivity for principle-related issues. Of note is
the fact that although the principles form a separate
cluster, this cluster has a much stronger affinity to the
moral as opposed to the strategic cluster. In contrast, we
hypothesized that members of hospital management
demonstrate greater sensitivity for strategy-related is-
sues. This is because they are more often faced with
strategy— and business-related problems in their work-
ing life. We were indifferent about the expectations re-
lated to the other, more general moral values. Since both
groups may be faced with problems tapping into issues
of e.g. honesty or fairness, both may have evolved some
sensitivity for such issues. Of main interest is, whether
our measure is capable of revealing the expected group
differences, supporting the validity of our instrument.
In conducting the group comparison, we recruited pro-
fessionals from nursing on the one hand and from hospital
management, administration and human resources on the
other. As outlined, we aimed at demonstrating the instru-
ment’s capability to differentiate between these two
cohorts (professionals from management: increased sensi-
tivity for strategy-related issues, nursing professionals:
increased sensitivity for values relevant in clinical practice,
i.e. principle-related values).
Participants and procedures
In this study, 57 participants from various clinics located
in the German part of Switzerland filled out the ques-
tionnaire. After rigorous examination of the data, 48
datasets fulfilled our quality criteria: participants were
required to self-categorize them to one of the two
groups and were required to have patient contact either
on a daily basis (nursing professionals) or fewer than
once a month (hospital management). 37 (30 females)
were nursing professionals whereas 11 (7 males) worked
in the field of hospital management, human resources or
administration. There was a statistically significant gen-
der misbalance and mean age difference (mean age:
nursing: 39 years, management: 48 years). This gender
misbalance, however, is not surprising given that nursing
and management are among the most sharply sex-
segregated of occupations. The two groups did not
significantly differ in the time needed for completing the
questionnaire (see Table 2).
In the questionnaire, we first assessed demographic in-
formation (gender, age, field of work) and information
about participant’s work experience in medicine (dur-
ation and frequency of contact to patients). Participants
then were briefly instructed how to fill out the question-
naire. Subsequently, they were asked to put themselves
into the role of a clinical expert in charge who is partly
involved as a committee member of a clinical expert-
group. They were told that currently, there were five
cases (i.e. vignettes) to be discussed during the upcom-
ing committee meeting during which they were expected
to bring in spontaneously the considerations they
deem important for the case evaluation. We explicitly
noted that decisions about which concrete actions to
take would be elaborated at a later time. In order to
prevent biased responses, we also refrained from
telling respondents that there are moral issues in the
presented vignettes.
Next, the five vignettes were randomly presented on
the computer screen: after having read one vignette
which disappeared upon clicking the “next”-button, par-
ticipants were provided with a list of 11 value-related
statements (see step 2: value representation). Thus, par-
ticipants were provided with all 11 values from the three
clusters (i.e. in form of 11 statements) for the value se-
lection step following vignette inspection. For most
values, there were multiple statements which satisfied
quality criteria (see step 2: value representation). Hence,
we presented participants with the most suitable state-
ments to content. They were asked to select those state-
ments which they consider to be associated with the
situation. They could select as many statements as they
liked. This task was designed to examine which values
participants recognize in each vignette. Next, the vignette
reappeared together with all previously chosen statements,
and participants were asked to distribute points (i.e. allo-
cate importance) to these statements. In total, 10 points
had to be distributed to the statements, including the pos-
sibility that some statements could receive 0 points. This
Table 2 Demographic differences of groups
Nursing Management Significance level
Number of participants 37 11
Mean age [years] 39 48 MW: p = 0.01
Years of employment 17 15 n.s.
Gender-ratio f: 30, m: 7 f: 4, m: 7 MW: p = 0.005
Time needed for filling out questionnaire [min] 39 44 n.s.
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task was designed to assess the perceived importance of
the selected value (see Fig. 1 for instrument process illus-
tration purposes).
This procedure negates the possibility of “wrong” an-
swers, e.g. by choosing statements that reflect values
where one may argue that they are not directly involved
in the vignette. Since reality is often ambiguous it is up
to individuals to interpret the situation. We know that
human perception is highly subjective and selective, but
dominant schemas do affect the perception process. For
example, morally sensitive individuals are generally more
likely to associate moral values within ambiguous situa-
tions because they are expected to have more easily
accessible moral schemas. As a result, they are also
expected to be more likely to direct attention more or
less automatically and swiftly to moral issues (see “Hy-
pothesis generation for expected group differences”).
The same holds for individuals that show a higher sensi-
tivity for strategic or principle-related values. This aligns
with previous conceptualizations (e.g. see [42]) after
which and as opposed to other ethics constructs (e.g.
formalism) which hold a clear position on what is right
and wrong, value sensitivity has additional explanatory
meaningfulness in simply acknowledging that individuals
are considering concepts associated with morality. Add-
itionally, categorizing a perceived value as wrong in itself
is a moral claim which would need justification in such
a way that it would introduce the challenge of defining a
deciding authority (i.e. who decides about the wrongness
of a given value). In our view, the process of perception
of values is a hermeneutical rather than absolutist
process. Overall, we posit that flexible and pluralistic
value-perception, theoretically speaking, is positive even
if this complicates moral decision-making and behavior
at a later stage. Specifically, we hypothesize that multiple
value perception reduces the risk of moral blindness [44]
and hence unethical behavior. Multiplicity in value rec-
ognition, however, should not be understood as a form
of relativism. Our notion refers to other claims [44] that
good decisions depend on perspective-taking and im-
agination and thus the ability of an individual to appraise
multiple aspects during decision making. It also supports
tolerance rather than fundamentalism.
Calculating value sensitivity
Participant’s value sensitivity scores were calculated by
combining both a) the number of values recognized in
each vignette and b) the importance attributed to these
recognized values operationalized as the number of
points assigned to those selected values. In this respect,
value sensitivity is congruent with previous definitions of
moral sensitivity as containing both the recognition and
the ascription of importance of moral-related issues (see
[6, 11, 42]). In order to calculate participant’s value
sensitivity for the three clusters, the mean number of
recognized values for each cluster separately of the ag-
gregated data of all five vignettes was calculated. Next,
we calculated the total number of allocated points for
each cluster and divided it by the total number of pos-
sible points. The mean of recognized values for each
cluster was then multiplied with the normalized number
of points allocated to the corresponding value-cluster.1
Hence, we summed all recognized principle-related
values across all vignettes and calculated the mean
which was multiplied by the normalized value of points
allocated to principle-related values for all vignettes in
order to calculate the sensitivity for principle-related
values. We calculated the sensitivity for the other two
value clusters in the same way. Consequently, potential
differences in perception between vignettes carried less
weight. By introducing a forced format with regard to the
distribution of points of importance, dependency of the
three constructs emerges. Because we align the
conceptualization of moral sensitivity to our construct, we
deliberately included the explicit task of prioritization of
previously recognized issues (see [11]).
Formally, the computation of value sensitivity is as fol-
lows: Let VSM, VSP, and VSS denote the value sensitivity
for moral-related values (M), principle-related values (P)
or strategy-related values (S). Furthermore, let NV be the
number of vignettes used; K be the number of points
that can be distributed to all chosen values per vignette;
and NM, NP and NS be the number of values per value
group (M, P or S). Finally, let ni
M, ni
Pand ni
S be the num-
ber of values chosen per vignette i and group; and ki
M,
ki
Pand ki
S be the number of points attributed to moral-
related, principle-related and strategy-related values per
vignette i, whereas ki
M + ki
P + ki
S = K. Then the generalized
definition of value sensitivity is given as:
VSM;P;S ¼ 1
NV NM;P;S
XNV
i¼1
nM;P;Si 
1
NV K
XNV
i¼1
kM;P;Si
In our case, NV = 5, K = 10 and (for example) NM = 4.
Thus, the sensitivity for generally moral values is calcu-
lated as:
VSM ¼ 1
20
X5
i¼1
nMi 
1
50
X5
i¼1
kMi
The calculation of VSP and VSS is analogous (NP = 4,
NS = 3).
Outcome
A Shapiro-Wilk-test analyzing normality was performed
and highlighted non-normality for sensitivity for strategy-
related values. We therefore conducted a Mann–Whitney
U Test as a non-parametric test in order to investigate
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group differences together with logistic regression. Statis-
tical significance was accepted at a p≤ 0.05 level.
We compared value sensitivity of nurses and hospital
managers for the three value groups (moral-related
values, principle-related values, strategy-related values)
(see Fig. 2). In terms of sensitivity for principle-related
values, the group comparison yielded a significant differ-
ence with nurses (M= 0.39, SD = 0.12) revealing higher
scores than management professionals (M= 0.32, SD =
0.09) (U (125.00) = −1.93, p = 0.05). In terms of sensitiv-
ity for strategy-related values, we found another signifi-
cant difference between the groups, with professionals
from hospital management revealing higher scores (M=
0.11, SD = 0.08) than nurses (M=0.05, SD = 0.07) (U
(110.00) = −2.30, p = 0.02). In terms of sensitivity for
general moral-related values, we found no significant
differences between the groups (p > 0.35). Conse-
quently, our instrument was able to discriminate be-
tween nursing- and management professionals as our
hypothesis predicted. Using logistic regression for in-
vestigating a main effect of group yielded a significant
result (main effect: χ2(3) = 9.703, p = .021). Analysis of
the main effect and visually examining the spider graph
reveals a shift of the managers’ sensitivities relating to
the strategic- and general moral value-cluster. It also re-
veals dependency of the 3 constructs based on the alloca-
tion of points of importance in step 2: because we
deliberately included the conceptualization of prioritizing
previously recognized issues (see [11]), denoting to decid-
ing which values are to a greater degree important and
which are not, the triangular shape representing normal-
ized sensitivities to the three clusters is different in degree
and not in kind.
Next, we tested for potential gender differences. A
Mann–Whitney U test yielded the following results: males
(M=0.11, SD = 0.09) demonstrated a significantly greater
sensitivity for strategy-related values compared to females
(M=0.04, SD = 0.06) (U (122.50) = −2.63, p = 0.01). On the
other hand, females (M = 0.39, SD = 0.12) demonstrated a
greater sensitivity for principle-related values compared to
males (M=0.33, SD = 0.10) (U (152.50) =−1.94, p = 0.05).
There was no significant gender difference regarding sensi-
tivity for generally moral-related values (p > 0.65).
Finally, the analysis of the frequency of each value se-
lected by participants across vignettes demonstrated only
minimal differences (6 comparisons of 110 involving 3
values (cost-efficiency, autonomy, loyalty — one of every
cluster) yielded a significant result only). This may cor-
roborate our negation of “wrong” value attribution (see
Additional file 1: Table S3 for a table indicating the
choices and what was selected by each group). Moreover,
testing Cronbach’s alpha to examine the reliability of the
overall scale provided a mixed result: although the
recognition task provided a good result (general moral-
related values: α = 0.736, strategy-related values: α =
0.836, principle-related values: α = 0.769), the overall
scale yielded a highly satisfactory result only for the stra-
tegic dimension (general moral-related values: α = 0.514,
strategy-related values: α = 0.742, principle-related values:
α = 0.466) — which is, however, the dimension where the
most robust group difference has been found. This indi-
cates that the differentiation between the generally moral-
and principle-related dimension might be reconsidered
when improving the scale in future research.
Discussion
In the context of this research project, we were successful
in executing a first trial of validity testing of our
developed tool for the measure of domain specific value-
sensitivity. Significant differences emerged when compar-
ing professionals from nursing compared with experts
from hospital management and -administration. More
specifically, nursing professionals demonstrated greater
sensitivity for principle-related values, while professionals
from hospital management and administration revealed
greater sensitivity for strategy-related values. This con-
firms our hypothesis. Finally, groups did not significantly
differ on more general moral-related values. As outlined
previously, we think that both groups may be faced with
problems tapping into issues such as honesty and fairness,
which might explain the indifference of the two groups.
This study incorporates the following limitations. First,
we are well aware of the fact that group comparisons are
only one step of validating instruments. Future studies are
needed to further test the instrument. In line with this, we
are currently running studies aiming at assessing concur-
rent as well as convergent validity by comparing our
instrument with other congruent or non-congruent ques-
tionnaires. Furthermore, we are in the process of comple-
menting the instrument with an implicit measure. Hence,
more research is needed for the development of an instru-
ment that is able to assess value sensitivity at an individual
level.
0.05
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0.20
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0.45
0.50 Managers
Nurses
strategy-related principle-related
moral-related
Fig. 2 Group comparison for moral-related, principle-related and
strategy-related value sensitivity
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Second, due to the small sample size, hospital man-
agers and administrators used in this study might not be
representatives of their profession. Moreover, the gener-
ally low level of strategic sensitivity for both groups
might have been extrinsically induced by application of
an unbalanced stimulus material: both, the moral— and
principle-related value clusters are composed of 4 values
each, whereas the strategy-related value cluster only
consisted of 3 values. Hence, the pure likelihood to
choose a strategic value was smaller.
Third, one has to take into account that, based on the
small sample size of at least one group and because of a
non-randomized study design, there might be intrinsic dif-
ferences between the individuals of the two groups related
to gender. Furthermore, we are unable to fully explore the
effects of gender detached from the domain of occupation,
since gender was endogenous to domain of occupation.
The influence of gender on morality is controversially dis-
cussed and appears also to depend on age, level of educa-
tion, occupation and their interrelation [45]. Whilst
studies investigating gender differences are largely contro-
versial, in most cases when gender differences can be
identified, women tend to show greater levels of moral
awareness, particularly when studies focus more closely
on care-based moral convictions [29, 46].
Finally, another important point is that the increased sen-
sitivity for strategy-related values of managers and the de-
creased sensitivity for principle-related values should not be
interpreted to suggest that managers are “less moral” com-
pared to nurses. We emphasize that our conceptualization
of value sensitivity favors the notion that an increased stra-
tegic sensitivity is not per se ethically less desirable. Rather,
professionals of a specific occupation are expected to dem-
onstrate a sensitivity that aligns directly with their
occupation-related values. Such a sensitivity is important
because a manager who is not aware of concepts including
e.g. cost-effectiveness, will not succeed in his daily work.
Furthermore, an insensitivity in this respect may very well
induce negative consequences for employees in the institu-
tion and therefore does have ethical implications. Apart
from that, managers did not differ in their sensitivity related
to other, more general moral values. It would therefore be
desirable to have design interventions at one’s disposal for
improving professionals’ sensitivity without compromising
their occupation-related thinking. In the end, such sensitiv-
ities should not substitute but supplement each other.
Conclusions
Living a moral life is not simply a matter of following a set
of learned moral rules and of learning how to apply these
rules to specific situations. By emphasizing the psychological
basis relevant for moral behavior, one (1) acknowledges the
increased scientific understanding of the foundations of
moral behavior and (2) thereby has the possibility to carve
out and provide means for their specific modulation. In this
research project, we attempted to incorporate current know-
ledge from social and moral psychology in order to develop
an instrument that allows for a status-quo assessment of
ones’ value sensitivity in the clinical care context that antici-
pates an additive possibility of specifically training the
underlying competency. This idea aligns with virtue ethics
by paying attention to our habits of character and develop-
ing these in order to act in a moral way.
We believe that the proposed instrument provides the
following advantages: (1) previous research suggests that
value-sensitivity is domain specific (see [4]). Identifying
specific subcomponents of value-sensitivity for different
domains (e.g. values that are especially relevant for a spe-
cific domain solely) or semantically varying values (e.g.
transparency in the economic field, honesty in medicine)
becomes a crucial task for developing instruments aimed
at assessing and increasing value-sensitivity. (2) The in-
strument is thought to represent a flexibly adaptable basic
module if understood as a loosely tool of interchangeable
building blocks. This involves relevant values for the spe-
cific context that can be identified and enacted. The in-
strument can then be complemented by incorporating
more — or simplified by incorporating less – values by ad-
hering to our procedure. (3) The instrument provides a
fully automated data acquisition process and could easily
be extended by an automated analysis algorithm providing
users with an instant status-quo assessment of ones’ moral
profile. Therefore, the time consuming steps of post-
coding open answers are omitted. Finally, (4) we intend to
complement the instrument by an implicit measure in
order to further accommodate insights gained from
psychological research.
Endnote
1To exemplify calculation: If a person has (over all 5 vi-
gnettes) in the mean recognized 2 out of 4 values of the
moral cluster, the “recognition rate” would be 0.5. And if
this person has (again over all 5 vignettes) attributed in
total 10 out of 50 possible points (i.e., 10 possible points
times 5 vignettes) to those values, the normalized number
of points would be 0.2. Hence, the result related to the
moral values for this person would be 0.5*0.2 = 0.1.
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